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COMMENT
CHILD v. PARENT: EROSION OF THE IMMUNITY RULE
Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon
the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.*
IN the year 1891, a mother wrongfully and maliciously caused her
daughter to be falsely imprisoned in a hospital for the insane. In a
suit by the daughter against the mother for damages, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, citing no precedent, denied recovery setting forth
the following reasons:
[S]o long as the parent is under an obligation to care for, guide
and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and
comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The
peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound
public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the
best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent.'
So began, with Hewlett v. George,2 the American rule that a parent is
not liable to an unemancipated minor child for torts committed by
the parent against the child.3 The rule of Hewlett v. George was fol-
lowed rapidly by two other states, 4 one of which reached the doubtful
* Exodus 20:12
1 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
2 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
3 There are no reported English cases on the subject of parental im-
munity. As a result, there is a split of authority in the United States as
to the origin of the immunity rule. Some courts take the view that the
lack of cases indicates that immunity was the common law rule and was so
generally accepted that there was never any parent-child litigation. See,
e.g., Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938); Owens
v. Auto. Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Meece v. Holland
Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142
N.E. 128 (1924); Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935); Elias v.
Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn.
537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932); Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240 (1954);
Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A. 153 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935);
Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888
(1930); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962); McKelvey
v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 79 P. 788 (1905). Other courts infer from the lack of cases that there
never was a common law rule that a child could not sue its parent. See, e.g.,
Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d
29 (Me. 1966); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Dean v.
Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,
150 A. 905 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952);
Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.
2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 886 (3d ed.
1964).
4 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (cruel and
inhuman punishment inflicted on child by stepmother with father's consent);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (rape of daughter by father).
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result of denying a daughter damages from her father after he had
raped her,5 and it eventually became the majority rule in the United
States.6 Yet, over the years there has been a gradual erosion of the
immunity rule in suits by child against parent.7 As so often happens
in the law, the erosion has been slow, and the first state to completely
abrogate the immunity doctrine did not do so until 1963.8 Beginning
with a survey of the background and reasons for the rule, this com-
ment will attempt to trace the curtailment of the rule and indicate
the future of parental immunity.
Development of the Rule
There were only a few cases in the area of parent-child litigation
prior to the landmark decision in Hewlett v. George,9 but these cases
indicated, at least impliedly, that a parent would be liable to his
child for willful torts. 10 Although none of these cases concerned torts
committed by a natural parent, the courts seemed to recognize that
the child had rights which could not be infringed upon by a person
standing in loco parentis.11 The meager precedent of these cases was
ignored by the courts that established the immunity rule. The judges
of the early 20th century had no inclination to allow a recovery even
for intentional and malicious physical injury to the child.12
Ever since the Hewlett case, the great majority of American
courts have professed to follow the rule that a parent is not liable to
his child for tortious conduct.'3 The blind following of this rule
5 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 244, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905), where the
court realized that the result was not desirable but said, "[I]f it be once
established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is no
practical line of demarkation [between what is a heinous crime and what
is not] that can be drawn ......
6 Cases cited note 13 infra.
7 The erosion of the rule is discussed in the text at notes 44-119 infra.
There has also been an erosion of the rule granting a child immunity for
torts committed by him against the parent. See, e.g., Balts v. Baits, 273 Minn.
419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
8 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). A Missouri
appellate court abolished the child's immunity in a suit against him by his
mother but the case was never followed. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109
(Mo. App. 1932).
9 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
10 Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885) (recovery for
negligence by one with whom the child was living); Lander v. Seaver, 32
Vt. 114 (1859) (student recovered from teacher for assault and battery due
to excessive punishment).
11 In loco parentis refers to a person who is charged with a natural
parent's rights, duties and responsibilities, and in effect stands in the place
of, a parent. BLAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 896 (4th ed. 1951).
12 Cases cited notes 1, 4 supra.
13 Augustin v. Oritz, 187 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1951) (Puerto Rico); Mi-
Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938); Rambo v.
Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d (1938); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77,
145 A. 753 (1929); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931); Bulloch
v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190
A. 753 (1937); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Baker v.
Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953); Marmion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc.
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seems illogical in light of the fact that most of these same courts al-
lowed children to maintain suits against their parents both in con-
tract14 and in actions concerning property rights.15 When confronted
with this incongruous result, courts explain it by saying that the law
will not allow one to be unjustly enriched with another's property, 6
or by simply saying that the actions are not comparable.17 While
there is no logical reason for the distinction,18 courts have persisted in
refusing to grant recovery to a child for personal injuries and have
continued to allow suits by the child for protection of property rights
and for breach of contract.
There are several reasons advanced as the bases of the immunity
rule. The first and most frequently cited 9 stems from the belief
that the family is the "cradle of civilization,' 20 something more than
a mere social unit.2- Because family harmony serves to promote
good citizenship and the general welfare of the family unit, the state
is said to have an interest in its preservation. 22 Anything which un-
dermines the peace and tranquility of the family also causes discord
and disturbs the smooth functioning and integrity of the social unit.23
Allowing a child to recover from his parent for personal injuries will
destroy parental authority and impair the security of the home.24
Essentially, justification for the immunity rule is reached through
68, 129 A. 431 (Cir. Ct. 1925); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236
(1942); Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Canen v.
Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E. 277 (1931); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67
(Okla. 1964); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Kelly v.
Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948); DeLay v. DeLay, 54 Wash. 2d 63, 337 P.2d 1057 (1959);
Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29,
269 P.2d 302 (1954) (Montana law). See generally McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HLv. L. REv. 1030 (1930).
'4 E.g., Neef v. Neef's Estate, 110 Ind. App. 309, 37 N.E.2d 682 (1941);
Hialey v. Hialey's Estate, 157 Mich. 45, 121 N.W. 465 (1909); Bunton v.
Newell, 239 S.W. 1096 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922); Sokolowski v. Lucey, 47 N.E.2d
627 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
'5 E.g., Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); McLain v.
McLain, 80 Okla. 113, 194 P. 894 (1921).
IG E.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
17 E.g., Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932).
is See generally W. PROSSER, ToRTs 886 (3d ed. 1964).
19 E.g., Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419
(1938); Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 50 DeL 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956);
Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); London Guar. & Acc.
Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71
N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (Super. Ct. 1962); Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361,
139 S.E.2d 676 (1965); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 (1963);
Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166
S.E. 538 (1932).
20 Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923).
21 Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
22 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Mannion v.
Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431 (Cir. Ct. 1925); Cowgill v. Boock, 189
Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (Rossman, J. concurring).
23 Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
24 Id.
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a balancing process. Against the detriment to the child by the abridg-
ment of his rights must be balanced the benefits accruing directly to
the child from the continuance of the parent-child relationship, un-
hampered by the effect of personal injury litigation.25 The benefits
to the child from the maintenance of family harmony far outweigh
any monetary gains to be made from litigation with his parent.26 In
other words, the "peace of the fireside and contentment of the home"27
are worth more than money.
A closely related argument is based on the policy of upholding the
parent's disciplinary authority.28 The father has the right and duty
to control, protect, support, guide and educate his child.29  The re-
ciprocal duty of the child is to serve and obey the father.30 If the
child knew that he could sue his parent for every tort which the
parent committed against the child, the status of parental authority
would rapidly deteriorate. The child would soon learn to pay no
attention to his parent and do as he pleased. The state's interest in
maintaining parental authority and discipline would also be under-
mined, for through discipline the child is deterred from leading a
criminal or dissolute life.81
While the parent does not have unlimited discretion in the actions
he may take against his child,32 he is allowed a great deal of discre-
tion, and to make him liable to the child for every tort would not be
in the best interests of either the parent or the child. Thus, it has
been said in several cases that the family harmony and parental au-
thority arguments are the only ones that have any substance, and
some courts have based their opinions solely on either or both of
these arguments.33
Another frequently advanced reason for the denial of recovery
to the child is that such recovery will tend to deplete the family ex-
chequer.34  When there are other dependents in the family, a re-
25 Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964), noted in 20 OHLA. L. REV.
93 (1967).
26 "It is deemed better that an occasional wrong should go unrequited
than that family life should be subjected to the disrupting effects of such
suits." Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 2, 156 S.E. 750, 751 (1931).
27 Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 585, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923).
28 E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Kemp v.
Rockland Leasing, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 1073, 274 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Fowler, v., Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Maxey v. Sauls, 242
S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d
323 (1965).
29 Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
30 Id.
'31 Cases cited note 22 supra.
32 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); State v. Koonse,
123 Mo. App. 655, 101 S.W. 139 (1907); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W.
640 (1903); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Hoffman v.
Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642,
251 P.2d 149 (1952).33 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Goller v. White, 20
Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
34 E.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
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covery by one child against the father will have a detrimental effect
upon the other dependents by reducing the resources available to the
entire family. While some courts have mentioned this reason as a
basis for upholding immunity, others have found it relatively easy to
refute.85 They claim that the exchequer argument "ignores the par-
ent's power to distribute his favors as he will, and leaves out of the
picture the depletion of the child's assets of health and strength"30,
which results from the injury. As an additional argument against the
exchequer theory, it is said that when the parent carries liability in-
surance no reduction in family assets will occur.37
Some courts fear that if the child is allowed to recover, there is
a chance the parent will reacquire all of the damages paid to the
child.38 If the child dies intestate during his minority, the parent
would be his next of kin and through the laws of intestate succession
might inherit all of the child's property,39 including the money paid
by the father as damages for the tort. This, of course, is a rather re-
mote possibility, and the same contingency exists in suits concerning
property rights, which are readily allowed.
40
Some courts put reliance on other legal remedies available to the
injured child. It is often contended, although not as frequently to-
day as 30 years ago, that the criminal law provides adequate punish-
ment for the tortfeasor-parent without the added burden of paying
damages to his injured child.41 Additionally, loss of custody can be
visited upon the parent for abuses which are clearly injurious to the
child.4 These are deemed to be adequate legal remedies, and the
right to damages is denied because of them.
Such are the historical and modern reasons advanced for the
denial of the child's right to recover. They have been repeated in
many cases and are the premises to be refuted by any court seeking to
limit or abrogate parental immunity. The reasons for the immunity
rule are based on the proposition "that the relation of child to parent
limits the child's rights, that would otherwise exist, to demand repa-
ration for unlawful conduct towards him on the part of the parent."43
The remainder of this comment will trace the deterioration of the
rule of parental immunity.
35 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 362 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.
1966) (with restrictions based on insurance); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314,
211 A.2d 410 (1965); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Borst
v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
36 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930).
87 See Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 362 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.
1966); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
88 E.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
89 E.g., CAL. PROB. COD. § 225.
40 Cases cited note 15 supra.
41 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Smith v. Smith,
81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199
N.W. 97 (1924); Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Matarese
v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn.
388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (dicta).
42 Cases cited note 41 supra and, e.g., CAL. Civ. CoDE § 203.
43 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930).
COMMKENT
The Erosion of ihe Rule
Running throughout the cases is the underlying policy that the
parent should be immune from liability for torts committed by him
which arise out of acts referrable to the parental relation. This means
that the law affords a great discretion to parents when it comes to
their duties and privileges qua parents. 44 Social policy favors the
maintenance of family harmony and parental discipline. In order to
foster this policy the parent should not be burdened with the fear of
suit from his child for omissions, such as his negligent failure to re-
pair a step in the house, or his inability to hold a job and adequately
support the family. Most of the exceptions which have evolved from
the broadly stated rule of immunity are attributable either to acts of
the parent which do not arise out of the parental relationship or to
acts which indicate that the parent has at least temporarily aban-
doned his position as a parent.
Willful or Malicious Torts
While the parent is allowed a wide discretion in the amount of
punishment or chastisement he may administer to his child, such dis-
cretion is not without limits. 45 An exception to the immunity rule
has developed which makes the parent liable to the child for damages
for a willful or malicious tort.46
This is not to say that every time a parent thinks that his child
needs a spanking he must first obtain a release from the child in order
to avoid being sued. He is still allowed a great deal of latitude in how
many times he may hit the child and which end of the belt he may
use. If, however, the parent's actions show he is venting his anger on
the child or beating the child just for the sake of the beating itself, as
opposed to punishing the child for his own welfare, the parent will
44 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Downs v. Poulin,
216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); State v. Koonse, 123 Mo. App. 655, 101 S.W. 139 (1907);
Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Chaffin v. Chaffin,
239 Ore. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406
P.2d 323 (1965); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). See
generally Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband
and Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 198 (1961).
45 Cases cited note 32 supra.
40 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (willful miscon-
duct while driving car); Buttrum v. Buttrum, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d
510 (1958) (reckless driving); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d
152 (1952) (reckless and drunk driving); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Il. 2d 608,
131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) (reckless driving); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77
A.2d 923 (1951) (intentional infliction of mental distress); Decker v. Decker,
20 Misc. 2d 438, 193 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (reckless and drunk driv-
ing); Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1952),
rev'd on other grounds, 284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1954) (reckless
driving); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966)
(reckless and drunk driving); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445
(1950) (drunk driving); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323
(1965) (drunk driving). For a comprehensive study of the cases involving
willful torts see Hume, Intra-Familial Immunity to Suit, 17 FED' oF Ixs.
Couxssi. Q. 45 (1966).
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subject himself to liability.47 By exceeding the bounds of reason-
ableness, the parent has abandoned his status as a parent and is in
the same position as an outsider, subject to all liability which could
be visited upon the third person.
48
Most courts agree that neither ordinary nor gross negligence will
pierce the shield of parental immunity,49 however, the decisions dif-
fer as to what degree of culpability is necessary to bring the parent
within the exception. Some courts require that the act be done mali-
ciously before the parent will lose his immunity,50 while others say
that actions done recklessly, that is, in willful and wanton disregard
of the consequences and rights of others, will suffice.51 The distinc-
tion is devoid of logic. Once the parent's actions exceed the bounds
of conduct referrable to the parental relationship, he should not be
heard to say that he did not maliciously intend to injure his child.
The absence of parental immunity for willful torts does not con-
flict with or inhibit reasonable discipline or the maintenance of family
harmony.5 2 Certainly it is more repugnant to leave the child without
redress for a willful tort than to hold the parent immune. When dis-
cipline takes the form of an intentionally wanton beating, it is in the
best interests of society to curtail rather than perpetuate it. When
the parental relationship is abandoned, the reason for the immunity
ceases to exist.
Emancipation
It has been recognized from the earliest case dealing with par-
ental immunity, Hewlett v. George,5 3 that if the child is emancipated
at the time the cause of action arises, he may maintain an action
against his parent.54 In the Hewlett case, the plaintiff had been mar-
47 See Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
48 A parent who takes his child in the car while intoxicated is tem-
porarily abdicating his parental responsibilities and is therefore not entitled
to immunity even though the ride is for family purposes. Hoffman v. Tracy,
67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965).
49 For a discussion of the decisions which have abolished immunity in
cases of ordinary negligence see text at notes 122-138 infra.
50 Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240 (1954), rehearing denied,
70 Nev. 296, 269 P.2d 265 (1954); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117,
216 N.E.2d 375 (1966). "[W]e conclude that an act by a parent, whether
described as willful or malicious or wanton, which will pierce the veil of
parental immunity, is an act which is done with an intention to injure the
child or is of such a cruel nature in and of itself as to evidence not a
reasonable normal parental mind, but an evil mind, malo animo ... " Chaf-
fin v. Chaffin, 239 Ore. 374, 387, 397 P.2d 771, 777 (1964).
51 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Buttrum v.
Buttrum, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.
2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Decker v. Decker, 20 Misc. 2d 438, 193 N.Y.S.2d
431 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
52 Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
53 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
54 The courts say that a child cannot recover for a tort which occurred
when he was unemancipated even though he may be emancipated at the
time of the suit. See, e.g., Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891);
Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A. 153 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
COMMIVENT
tied, but at the time of the false imprisonment she was separated from
her husband. The court said:
Whether she had resumed her former place in her mother's home,
and the relationship, with its reciprocal rights and duties, of a minor
child to her parents, does not sufficiently appear. If, by her marriage,
the relation of parent and child had been finally dissolved . .. then
it may be the child could successfully maintain an action against the
parent for personal injuries.55
This exception to the immunity rule has been followed universally. 6
The basis for the exception is that once emancipation has occurred
there is no longer the risk that family harmony or discipline will be
disrupted, since the child is considered to be on his own.57
When emancipation occurs is often a question of fact for the jury,
although the evidence may be so clear as to authorize the finding of
emancipation as a matter of law.5 8 Emancipation must be pleaded
and proved by the party seeking to recover.50 The emancipation must
be complete-partial emancipation will not suffice.60  Such com-
plete emancipation occurs by the act of the parent in surrendering all
his right to the services and earnings of the child as well as the right
to custody and control of his person. 61 In short, emancipation is a
matter of intent of the parent.6 2
The emancipation exception is not based on the theory that there
should be immunity for acts referrable to the parental relationship.
This is seen from the fact that in many cases a parent has been held
liable to his emancipated child for acts arising out of parental func-
tions and for acts attributable to his simple negligence.6 3 It would
55 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
56 Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1954);
Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930); Carricato v. Carricato,
384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (parent v. emancipated child); Skillin v.
Skillin, 130 Me. 223, 154 A. 570 (1931); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247,
114 N.W. 763 (1908); Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965)
(parent v. emancipated child); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74
S.E.2d 170 (1953).
57 Cf. Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930).
58 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Skillin v.
Skillin, 130 Me. 223, 154 A. 570 (1931) (question of fact); Warren v. Long,
264 N.C. 137, 141 S.E.2d 9 (1965) (30-year-old daughter found to be un-
emancipated as a matter of law); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74
S.E.2d 170 (1953) (question of fact).
59 Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (C.P. 1954).
60 Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956).
61 See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Taubert
v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C.
317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
62 Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953). As a
corollary, when emancipation occurs the parent is relieved of his duty to
support the child, and the child has no legal obligation to remain in the
parent's home and perform duties of an unemancipated child. The emanci-
pated child who does remain in the parent's home has the same status as any
other guest and the parent is not immune for torts to the child. See Farrar
v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930); Gillikin v. Burbage 263 N.C.
317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
68 Skillin v. Skillin, 130 Me. 223, 154 A. 570 (1931); Brumfield v.
Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953); cf. Carricato v. Carricato, 384
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seem that the true reason behind the exception is that none of the
customary reasons for parental immunity are applicable. The eman-
cipated child is beyond the age of discipline by his parent, and family
harmony takes on a different meaning with the emancipation. In
short, it can be said that the emancipation exception is not really an
exception at all, it is a situation to which the immunity rule was
never intended to apply.
Persons In Loco Parentis
There are numerous cases in which children have sued nonpar-
ents with whom they were temporarily or permanently living. The
earliest cases indicated that persons standing in loco parentis to the
child would not be protected by the same immunity as would the
child's natural parent. 4 These early cases all concerned intentional
torts committed against a child, and held that the defendants were not
immune from suit.65 Subsequent to these early decisions, a sizeable
amount of judicial authority on the subject has developed, and most
of it is jumbled. When the cases are sorted out, there are apparently
only a few instances when the child recovered against one truly
in loco parentis when he could not have recovered against his natural
parent. 6
Most of the cases can be classified as extensions of the rules and
exceptions applied to natural parents. Those cases which deny im-
munity to the person standing in loco parentis are cases which in-
volve willful or malicious torts committed against the child.67 These
holdings simply apply the same rule which is applied to natural par-
ents. Those decisions which grant immunity concern negligent torts,
the type of case in which the natural parent is also granted immun-
ity.68
S.W.2d 85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (parent recovered from his child for simple
negligence).
04 Cases cited note 10 supra.
65 Id.
(6 Cases cited note 70 infra.
07 Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (adoptive parent
liable for murder of child); Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d
736 (1959) (stepmother liable for battery); Treschman v. Treschman, 28
Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901) (stepmother liable for assault and battery);
Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo. App. 354 (1901) (teacher liable for assault and
battery); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903) (aunt liable for
cruel and inhuman treatment); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173
(1925) (assault and battery due to whipping).
68 Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931) (stepmother im-
mune from suit for negligence in driving automobile); Bricault v. Deveau,
21 Conn. Supp. 486, 157 A.2d 604 (Super. Ct. 1960) (stepparent immune for
negligence); Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895) (uncle immune for neg-
ligence); Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa 606, 91 N.W. 903 (1902) (aunt immune for
punishment inflicted within the bounds of parental discretion); Fortinberry
v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799 (1907) (one with whom child living immune
for punishment inflicted within the bounds of parental discretion); Rutkowski
v. Wasko, 286 App. Div. 327, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1955) (stepfather, if found to
be truly in loco parentis, immune for negligence in driving automobile); cf.
Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924) (foster parents immune in
a suit for deceit because the court found no duty to disclose).
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Some cases which seem to be examples of an in Zoco parentis ex-
ception to the immunity rule actually do not involve persons in loco
parentis to the child.69 Although the defendants have custody of the
child, they have not assumed the full range of duties and responsibili-
ties necessary to put them in the place of a natural parent, and there-
fore they have the same tort liability as any other person. In such
cases no policy argument commands that the defendant be granted
immunity. There can be no disruption of family harmony since there
is no true family in existence to disrupt. There is no undermining of
parental authority since the defendant is not a parent and does not
have any real authority to be weakened. The other reasons advanced
for immunity are equally inapplicable to the individual not truly in
loco parentis and for these reasons the courts have not afforded him
immunity. Here again it is technically inaccurate to treat this situa-
tion as an exception to the immunity rule. When the defendants do
not stand in the place of parents, they do not fall within the scope of
the doctrine of immunity.
The true exception to the rule is found in the few cases allowing
suit against a person in loco parentis where a natural parent would
have been immune had he been the defendant.70 The courts which
have denied immunity have either done so without reason 71 or have
based their opinions on the theory that members of the family are
becoming more independent, thus making the family less susceptible to
discord which might result from a tort suit.72 There is no acceptable
rationale for these decisions; if a person is truly in Zoco parentis to a
child, all of the reasons for granting immunity apply with the same
force as they do to natural parents. He has the same rights, duties
and privileges as a natural parent and should receive identical treat-
ment.7 3 Cases denying immunity are in a decided minority and most
courts have realized that those truly in loco parentis should be treated
as much like natural parents as possible.7 4
Business Negligence
There has been expanding acceptance of the rule that where a
tort arises from the parent's business activity the parent should be
69 E.g., Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913) (defendant
liable for assault and battery); Miller v. Davis, 49 Misc. 2d 764, 268 N.Y.S.2d
490 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (foster parent liable for negligence). See also Wilkins v.
Kane, 74 N.J. Super. 414, 181 A.2d 417 (Super. Ct. 1962) (contribution allowed
against a grandmother who was not truly in loco parentis).
70 E.g., Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D. Vt. 1963) (stepfather
liable for negligence in automobile accident); Cwik v. Zylstra, 58 N.J. Super.
29, 155 A.2d 277 (App. Div. 1959) (grandmother liable for negligence). See
also Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939), where the court
found an adopted mother to be immune for a willful tort.
71 Cwik v. Zylstra, 58 N.J. Super. 29, 155 A.2d 277 (App. Div. 1959).
72 Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D. Vt. 1963).
73 One court has said that when the law removes some of he enticements
for adoption and other assumptions of the parental relationship by one not
the natural parent of a child, it does so to its own detriment; and that the
social interest in families should command that all reasonable advantages be
given to one contemplating assumption of the role of parent to a fatherless
child. London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954).
74 Cases cited notes 67, 68 supra.
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liable to his child.75 This exception to the immunity rule is based on
the fact that an injury occurring as a result of the parent's vocation
is not referrable to the parental relationship.76 While engaged in
his business the parent owes the full duty of care to anyone with
whom he might come in contact, including his own child. In this re-
spect the child becomes a member of the public and is no different
from any other child who might, for example, be playing in the drive-
way of a home into which the parent drives his truck.
The first case to consider the parent's liability for business negli-
gence was Dunlap v. Dunlap,77 a well reasoned and often cited New
Hampshire opinion. The plaintiff child was employed by his father
and suffered personal injuries when a staging on which he was work-
ing collapsed. The father carried employer's liability insurance and
the insurer knew that the minor son was on the payroll. The court
discussed most of the available precedent and held that the son
could recover from the father:
The present suit is not for an intentional wrong, but for a negligent
one, growing out of the relation of master and servant. As to this
employment, the father had intentionally surrendered his parental
control.7S
The court felt that the father intended to assume the full responsi-
bility of a master to his employee-son and to release his parental con-
trol so far as necessary to attain that end. As evidence of the father's
intent the court relied on the fact that the employer's insurance cov-
ered injury to the son, indicating a true employer-employee relation-
ship.79 Underlying the decision was the dual capacity of the father
and it was due to his negligence in the capacity of master rather than
parent which caused the child's injury.
In cases where the child has been injured by an instrument or
member of a partnership of which his parent is a partner, some of the
decisions have turned on the state's conception of a partnership. For
example, in two cases where the partnership was not a legal entity
under state law and the partners were jointly and severally liable, the
courts held the partnership immune since a suit against the partner-
ship was in reality a suit against the parent.80 The one case which
discussed the issue and found the partnership liable did so on the basis
that the partnership was a legal entity.8' The judgment against the
partnership was held not to be a judgment against its members and
75 Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Signs v.
Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va.
11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952);
Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). Contra, Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938), where the court said that it would be
impossible to draw a line of distinction between acts which were referrable
to parenthood and those which were not. See generally Sanford, Personal
Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823, 835. (1956).
70 E.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
77 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
78 Id. at 364, 150 A. at 911.
79 Id. The effect of insurance coverage on the law of parental immunity
is discussed more fully at notes 114-119 infra.
80 Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932); Aboussie v.
Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
81 Cody v. J. A. Dodds & Sons, 252 Iowa 1394, 110 N.W.2d 255 (1961).
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the entity was not immune from suit even though one of the partners
was the plaintiff's father. The latter case would seem the better re-
sult. Regardless of whether or not a partnership is a legal entity
under state law, any injury which occurs as a result of partnership
business is not referrable to the parental relation.
The case of Signs v. Signs 2 best exemplifies how cases involving
a partnership should be treated. There, due to the negligence of a
partnership of which the father was a member, a gasoline pump
caught fire and injured the plaintiff. The court found the partnership
liable saying that tort actions in the family are rare and when they
are brought there is no family harmony left to be disturbed. 3 Since
the father was engaged in business at the time of the accident, the
immunity rule was held to be inapplicable. The case did not turn
upon the legal status of a partnership.
4
Parental immunity was denied in two cases where a carrier-
passenger relation existed between the parent and the child.8 5 In
allowing damages, each court relied heavily on the fact that the par-
ents were covered by liability insurance and indicated that insurance
eliminated most of the reasons advanced for the immunity rule.86
The courts recognized that the actions were brought against the par-
ents in their vocational capacities as carriers rather than for violations
of moral or parental obligations. Stating that there was really a
cause of action against the parent which was simply blocked by the
immunity, the courts removed the immunity for the breach of duty
as a carrier and allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their rights.
87
In the recent case of Trevarton v. Trevarton88 the court allowed
an action against a father in the logging business who negligently
allowed a felled tree to be dragged across his sleeping son. In holding
that there was no sufficient reason to deny a remedy to the child when
the injury was inflicted in the performance of duties relating to busi-
ness, the court said:
To justify any rule of immunity courts have been wont to grasp
desperately for reasons, but many, if not all, fail to withstand attack
when subjected to the light of logic and reason.8 9
Surely reason commands that when the injury inflicted upon the
child is not connected with any parental duty or privilege there is no
purpose in perpetuating the rule of immunity.
82 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
83 Id. at 576, 103 N.E.2d 748.
84 The case of Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) allowed
a child to recover from his father who was a member of a partnership for a
tort committed while acting in the scope of his partnership activities.
85 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (father owned a
bus line on which daughter was riding); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166
S.E. 538 (1932) (father owned a school bus on which daughter was riding).
so Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 28, 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 (1939); Lusk v.
Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 19, 166 S.E. 538, 539 (1932).
87 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 27, 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 (1939); Lusk v.
Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 19, 166 S.E. 538, 539 (1932).
88 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963).
89 Id. at 421, 378 P.2d at 641.
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Third Party Liability
The great majority of the courts have held that immunity is a
personal privilege and does not extend to a third party who is liable
for the negligence of the parent.90 The question arises most fre-
quently in cases where the parent's employer is sued by the child for
a tort committed by the parent while in the scope of his employ-
mentY1 The arguments advanced against recovery on the basis of
respondeat superior have been twofold. The employer contends that
his liability is derivative, that he is not liable unless the employee is
liable.9 2  The other argument advanced is that to allow the suit
against the employer is to allow the plaintiff to do indirectly what he
cannot do directly, since the employer is entitled to a right of indem-
nity from the negligent employee for whose acts the employer is held
liable.9 3 That is, by allowing the child to sue and recover against the
employer, it in effect is allowing him to sue his parent. Both of
these arguments have been effectively overcome by the courts.
The courts which have denied immunity to the employer have de-
clared that the child's right to sue the employer is an independent
primary right which is not dependent upon any right to sue the serv-
ant.9 4 The principal is liable for the agent's negligence even though
the agent may not be held accountable to the plaintiff.95 The im-
munity defense is personal to the parent and no sound reason exists
for permitting the employer to share that which ought to be confined
within the family. These courts reason that while the master does
have a right of indemnity against the servant, it is not by way of sub-
rogation to the child's action against the parent, but is for the breach
of the agency contract in the duty owed by the servant to the mas-
ter. 6  These are effective arguments in favor of the denial of im-
munity to the employer and go far in evidencing the dissatisfaction
with the immunity rule entertained by many courts.9 7
90 Cases cited notes 91, 97 infra.
91 Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938); Chase
v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (1930);
Stapleton v. Stapleton, 85 Ga. App. 728, 70 S.E.2d 156 (1952); O'Connor v.
Benson Coal Co., 301 Mass. 145, 16 N.E.2d 636 (1938); Radelicki v. Travis,
39 N.J. Super. 263, 120 A.2d 774 (App. Div. 1956); Sullivan v. Christiensen, 191
N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Foy v. Foy Electric Co., 231 N.C. 161, 56 S.E.2d
418 (1949); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948).
92 The following cases have found the employer immune on the basis
that his liability is derivative: Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App.
164 (1933); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952).
93 The following cases have found the employer immune because he
would have a right to indemnity from the employee: Myers v. Tranquility
Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb.
211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959); Smith v. Henson, 214 Tenn. 541, 381 S.W.2d 892
(1964); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952).
94 Cases cited note 91 supra.
95 Cases cited note 91 supra.
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 (1958). It has also been
said that employers do not usually sue their employees for indemnity. Chase
v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (1930).
97 Analogous cases arise with respect to the owner of an automobile who
is made liable by statute for the negligence of one driving the car with the
owner's permission. When the driver is the parent of the plaintiff the same
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Questions of third party liability also arise when a defendant seeks
contribution from the plaintiff's parent. The cases occur when the
defendant is sued by the child for a tort caused by the concurring
negligence of the defendant and the child's parent. In most of the
states where the parent is immune from direct suit by the child, con-
tribution from the negligent parent has also been denied.9 These
decisions are usually based on the rule that contribution will only be
allowed where the plaintiff has an enforceable right against the joint
tortfeasor.99 Since the child has no enforceable right against the
parent, no contribution can be had.
Of the few cases which have allowed recovery by way of contri-
bution, only one can be cited as being squarely in conflict with the
majority view.100 In that case the court said that contribution is not
recovery for the tort but is the enforcement of an equitable duty to
share liability for the wrong done. The other cases allowing contri-
bution are distinguishable on their facts. 01'
The idea that immunity is a personal defense of the parent per-
meates all of the cases in the area of third party liability. This reason-
ing is seemingly a judicial limitation imposed in order to curtail the
unjust effect that immunity has on the child and is illustrative of the
growing trend away from immunity.
Actions Commenced when Parent or Child is Dead
Many courts have abolished immunity when either the parent or
the child is dead at the time of the suit.1'0- These decisions are based
reasoning is applied in allowing recovery against the owner as has been
discussed with regard to respondeat superior. See Kemp v. Rockland Leasing,
Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 1073, 274 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Smith v. Smith, 116
W. Va. 230, 179 S.E. 812 (1935) (suit by mother against owner of car which
son was driving); Le Sage v. Le Sage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937). But
see Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 315, 237 N.W. 188 (1931).
98 E.g., Scruggs v. Meredith, 135 F. Supp. 376 (D. Hawaii 1955); Strahorn
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956); London Guar. &
Acc. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954); Lewis v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Greta-
kis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934).
99 See W. PRossER, TORTS 277 (3d ed. 1964).
100 Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa, 219,'110 A.2d 175 (1955).
101 In Rouley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.
La. 1964), contribution was allowed against the parent's insurer based on a
statute allowing suit directly against the insurance company without first
having to find the insured liable. The court expressly ruled that the personal
defense of immunity could be raised by the father but not by his insurer.
In Rodebaugh v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401
(1966), contribution was allowed against the parent for willful and wanton
conduct in driving a car. In Wilkins v. Kane, 74 N.J. Super. 414, 181 A.2d
417 (L. Div. 1962), contribution was allowed against the child's grandmother
who was not truly in loco parentis. In Briggs v. City of Philadelphia, 112
Pa. Super. 50, 170 A. 871 (1934); rev'd on other grounds, 316 Pa. 48, 173 A.
316 (1934) contribution was allowed against the father because of a covenant
in his lease to keep a sidewalk in good repair.
102 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 362 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.
1966) (children v. mother's estate); Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.
Pa. 1954), aff'd, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958) (son v. father's estate); Ruiz v.
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on the theory that there is a cause of action which accrues to the
child when he is injured by his parent but it is blocked by parental
immunity. The immunity rule is here again held to be a personal
privilege and the bar to the child's action is removed by the death of
the parent. Since one of the major reasons for the immunity rule is
the protection of family harmony, when the family relationship
ceases to exist the rule of immunity should also cease. There is no
chance of disruption of family life or weakening of parental authority
and no risk of collusion between parent and child when insurance is
involved. Thus, the majority of courts allow recovery by a child in
a suit against a parent's estate for personal injuries incurred before
the parent's death.
10 3
Those courts which have applied the immunity rule and have
denied the child his cause of action when the parent is deceased have
done so on various grounds. Some courts state that it is for the legis-
lature to abolish the rule of immunity upon the death of the tort-
feasor.104 Other courts maintain that to allow the action would
deceased parents.'0 5 Still other courts contend that death cannot cre-
ate a cause of action in the child, 0 6 but these courts fail to recognize
that a duty toward the child is violated at the time of the tort and it is
only the right to recovery which is barred by the personal immunity of
the parent. On the whole, the logic of the cases denying recovery
seems faulty when compared with the well-reasoned opinions allowing
the child to recover.
Wrongful Deafh
Many states have abolished the rule of immunity in suits by a
child or a child's estate for the wrongful death of the child or the
other parent. Not only does the logic of the immediately preceding
discussion apply, but the courts also base their decisions on interpre-
tations of their wrongful death statutes. The courts upholding the
actions say that the wrongful death statutes create a new cause of
action in the plaintiff which is unhampered by the personal immunity
of the parent.10 7  This reasoning applies both where the plaintiff is
Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) (children v. father's estate-based -on
interpretation of statute); Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 76
(1940) (estate of father v. child); Brannecke v. Kilpatrick,. 336 S.W.2d 68
(Mo. 1960) (daughter v. mother's estate); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211
A.2d 410 (1965) (children v. father's estate); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super.
294, 176 A.2d 818 (L. Div. 1962) (children v. father's estate); Vidmar,v.
Sigmund, 192 Pa. Super. 355, 162 A.2d 15 (1960) (daughter v. father's- estate);
Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 -(1962) (mother's estate v.
child); Krause v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 666, 112 N.W.2d 134 (1961)
(children v. deceased father's insurer).
103 Virtually all of the decisions cited in note 102 supra advance the rea-
soning set forth in the text as the bases of their holdings.-
104 E.g., Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 (1963).
105 Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940); see Miller v.
Flashner, 8 App. Div, 2d 944, 190 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1959); Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C.
361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965); Capps v. Smith, 263 N.C. 120, 139 S.E.2d 19 (1964).
106 Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C.
247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963).
107 Cases cited notes 108, 109 infra.
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suing as administrator for the death of the child 0 8 and where the
child himself is suing for the wrongful death of the other parent.10 9
Other courts allow the plaintiff to recover because the statute does
not expressly exclude him as a plaintiff."0
Interesting questions of immunity arise when the suit is by the
representative of a deceased parent against the surviving parent for
wrongful death and the only real beneficiaries of the recovery are
the children."' The defendant parent usually pleads that he should
not be held liable to the true beneficiaries because of the immunity
rule. In answering this argument the courts apparently look only to
the form and not the substance of the suit,1 12 holding that since the
action is not truly a suit by the child the immunity rule is inappli-
cable." 3 The recovery might be viewed as compensation to the bene-
ficiaries for their loss as sustained through the death, and to allow
immunity to be asserted would defeat the policy of the wrongful
death statutes.
The arguments advanced for abrogation of the immunity rule on
the death of a parent or child should apply with equal force when the
suit is for the wrongful death of a parent or child. The fact that in
one type of action a child is suing a parent's estate for personal in-juries and in the other for wrongful death should not change the
logic of the result. All family harmony and discipline arguments in
favor of immunity disappear with death, and wrongful death statutes
should not be interpreted as a bar to a legitimate recovery by the
child.
Liability Insurance
Virtually all courts agree that if the child is not entitled to re-
cover from his parent at the time of the tort, the fact that the parent
is insured will not change this result." 4 However, many courts have
108 Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961);
Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 107 N.W.2d 531 (1961) (suit by trustee).
Compare Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934) with Cronin
v. Cronin, 244 Wis. 372, 12 N.W.2d 677 (1944). Contra, Owens v. Auto Mut.
Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App.
241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Goldsmith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931).
109 E.g., Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963). Contra,
Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956); Strong v.
Strong, 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240 (1954).
110 E.g., Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950). Contra, Dur-
ham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 85 So. 2d 807 (1956).
I" E.g., Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1966); Albrecht v.
Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934) (suit by emancipated daughter's
estate with mother as sole beneficiary of recovery).
112 E.g., Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1966); Albrecht v.
Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934). Contra, Heyman v. Gordon, 40
N.J. 52, 190 A.2d 670 (1963), where the court expressly stripped the suit of
formalities and disguise and barred recovery from a parent by finding that
the child was the only true party in interest.
"13 E.g., Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1966). Of course, thejurisdiction must either allow suits between husband and wife or follow the
reasoning of those courts which hold that death abrogates immunity.
114 Augustin v. Ortiz, 187 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1951) (Puerto Rico); Villaret
v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235
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commented on the fact that insurance is so common today that it
should not be ignored in testing the current validity of the reasons for
the immunity rule." 5
When the parent has appropriate insurance coverage many of the
major reasons advanced for sustaining the immunity rule are elimi-
nated. Where there is insurance coverage it is fairly obvious that
the argument concerning depletion of the family exchequer does not
apply. Further, the fact that the parent no longer must personally
compensate his child for a tortious wrong reduces the possibility that
effective discipline of the child will be undermined. Finally, the
family harmony doctrine is diminished since the chances of disturbing
family tranquility are lessened when the parent is not required to
pay the child. Actually, where there is insurance coverage, a lawsuit
may weld a family even closer since all members are striving for the
common goal of reparation to the child.1 6 However, insurance cover-
age creates a new and difficult problem: the increased possibility of
fraud and collusion between the parent and child in their attempt to
secure insurance benefits.'
1 7
It would seem that many courts have been impressed with and
deterred by the risk of fraud, as evidenced by the fact that no court
has eliminated any phase of immunity solely because of insurance
coverage." 8  Illustrative of the judicial fear of abolishing immunity
are the courts which deny recovery both on the basis of the family
harmony doctrine and the inconsistent concept of the risk of fraud
Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468
(1938); Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956); Mesite
v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App.
1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175,
211 N.W. 88 (1926); London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64
N.W.2d 781 (1954); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean
v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc.
1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 284 App. Div.
652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1954). Canen v. Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E. 277
(1931); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Tucker v.
Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964); Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570
(1963); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lasecki v. Kabara,
235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
"5 Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere,
- N.H. -, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905
(1930); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
116 Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (Musmanno, J. dis-
senting).
".7 The parent also finds himself in a difficult position being torn between
his desire to help his child recover and his duty to aid the insurer. See, e.g.,
Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H.
314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743
(1952).
118 While many courts express the fear of fraud and collusion where the
parent is covered by insurance, perhaps the best answer to this apprehension
is found in Briere v. Briere, - N.H. -, -, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966), where
the court said: "Our court system, with its attorneys and juries, is experi-
enced and reasonably well fitted to ferret out the chicanery which might
exist in such cases."
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and collusion. 119 The inconsistency of the theories is clear: a suit
cannot at one and the same time tear the family asunder and bring
it together. The courts seem generally confused over what are the
present reasons, if any, for the immunity rule, and they are unable
to deal with the effect of insurance coverage on the validity of the
reasons advanced for immunity.
The Modern Trend
A firmly imbedded rule of law is not wiped away in a single
stroke. It often takes many years to whittle down the rule with ex-
ceptions until the day finally arrives when the minority rule be-
comes the majority rule. The law of parental immunity is an example
of just such a slow evolutionary process. The rule began in 1891 with
a single case 1 20 and remained the undisputed law until judges started
writing dissents' 2 1 and courts began carving out many of the excep-
tions discussed above. In 1963, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 122
abolished the rule of parental immunity in negligence cases, the one
type of action where the rule had remained firmly entrenched. 2 3
The abrogation was complete except for two well reasoned exceptions.
In denying immunity to a foster father 1 24 for injuries sustained by
his foster son while riding on the drawbar of a tractor driven by the
defendant, the court said:
[W] e consider the wide prevalence of liability insurance in personal-
injury actions a proper element to be considered in making the policy
decision of whether to abrogate parental immunity in negligence ac-
tions. This is because in a great majority of such actions, where
such immunity has been abolished, the existence of insurance tends to
negate any possible disruption of family harmony and discipline.125
The rule was abolished in all instances of negligence except cases:
(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental
authority over the child [a parental privilege]; and (2) where the
alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discre-
tion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical
and dental services, and other care [parental duties].126
The most significant decision to date is the 1966 case of Briere v.
119 For a general discussion, see Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d
149 (1952).
120 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
121 See the dissents in the following cases: Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J.
247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35,
174 N.E.2d 718 (1961); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551,
288 N.Y.S. 135 (1928) (mem. decision with Cardozo, Andrews and Crane,
J.J., dissenting); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Parks
v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); Wick
v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
122 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
123 Cases cited note 13 supra. See generally, Comment, Abrogation of the
Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 12 S. DAK. L. REV. 364 (1967).
124 While the facts of the case concerned one in loco parentis, the decision
clearly was not limited to persons in loco parentis. The language used by the
court was sufficiently broad to cover natural parents. See Goller v. White,
20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963).
125 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
126 Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
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Briere12 7 where the Supreme Court of New Hampshire completely
abolished parental immunity for negligent torts. The court met the
usual arguments with relative ease and noted that while there was a
danger of fraud and collusion due to insurance coverage, the judicial
system with its attorneys and juries was "reasonably well fitted to
ferret out the chicanery which might exist in such cases."'128 The
mere opportunity for fraud was thought not to be an insuperable
barrier to an honest and meritorious action by a minor.
While the court repeated the rule that insurance could not im-
pose a duty upon a parent where none existed before, it recognized
that the widespread existence of insurance coverage could not be
ignored in determining the validity of the immunity rule. 29 It
quoted the contention in the Dunlap'3" case that the family exchequer
reason for the immunity rule is a mere makeweight, and added that
the prevalence of liability insurance coverage eliminated any risk to
family assets. It was impossible for the court to perceive how par-
ental authority and family well-being could be more jeopardized in a
tort action than in an action concerning contract or property.' 3 '
Actually, since insurance generally covers tort liability and not con-
tract damages,'1 32 family harmony would be less threatened in a tort
action. Clearly insurance coverage was a major element in the case
and the court greatly emphasized it.33
The New Hampshire court did not limit its decision, as did the
Wisconsin court, to those torts outside the area of parental control
and duties. The Wisconsin solution is possibly the ideal end to be
achieved. Generally stated, immunity is eliminated in Wisconsin ex-
cept where the parent's conduct is referrable to the parental relation-
ship, an area in which the parent should be alloted a wide amount of
discretion without fear of liability. No liability should be imposed
on the parent for negligently or otherwise being unable to provide
food and clothing for his children and he should still have a free
hand, within limits, to discipline the child. The New Hampshire court,
which completely eliminated the rule of parental immunity, may find
itself having to later limit its ruling in order to prevent chaos. Such
complete abrogation of immunity might lead, for example, to a suit
by a child against its parent for damage caused by the parent's negli-
gent failure to have a cavity filled in the child's tooth. While the
example may seem ludicrous, it is not inconceivable that such a suit
could result from complete abrogation of the rule of parental im-
munity.13 4
127 - N.H. -, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
128 Id. at -, 224 A.2d at 590.
129 Id.
130 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
131 Briere v. Briere, - N.H. -, -- 224 A.2d 588, 591 (1966).
132 Id.
133 Id.
'34 A 1924 Canadian case, Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Marchand, [1924] 4 D.L.R.
157, is the first reported opinion in which a child was allowed to recover from
his father for negligence. The court acknowledged that the action against the
child's own parent seemed shocking, but made it clear that it would be equally
repugnant that "a child injured by his father's negligent act, perhaps maimed
for life, should have no redress for the damage he has suffered." Id. at 166.
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New Hampshire has been a leader in limiting the doctrine of in-
munity thus making the Briere decision the most significant to date
despite the potential problems resulting from the breadth of the
holding. The Dunlap case has been cited numerous times'3 5 and has
been the basis for decisions which abolished parental immunity when
the parent's business was involved. 36  Further, New Hampshire has
established a blueprint for other states to follow. Just prior to the
Briere case the court abolished immunity when one of the parents
was dead,137 and later it eliminated the immunity of the child in a suit
by the parent for negligence. 138  All the exceptions to the immunity
rule developed by the New Hampshire court culminated in the Briere
case as the final step in abrogation of immunity. Most states are
developing rules limiting immunity and are paralleling the evolution
of the doctrine which has occurred in New Hampshire. It can be ex-
pected that in light of New Hampshire's position in the area, many
states may rapidly follow suit. Indications are that in the not-too-
distant future absence of parental immunity may be the majority
rather than the minority view.
Conclusion
The rule of parental immunity is based on three cases which are
The case was not followed in the United States apparently because of the
firm entrenchment of the Hewlett rule.
The Supreme Court of Washington has said that within limits the parent
should be immune for torts resulting from the discharge of parental duties.
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
In 1966 the Minnesota Supreme Court abolished the immunity rule in
suits by the parent against the child. Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.
2d 66 (1966). Although the court expressly said that it did not wish to be
understood as intimating that tort immunity would be abolished in actions
by child against parent, it is a safe prediction, as the dissent notes, that in
the near future the immunity of parents will also be abolished. Id. at 433,
438-39, 142 N.W.2d at 75, 78. The decision was lengthy and the court dis-
cussed the entire evolution of the rule of immunity. The court was not per-
suaded that the complete elimination of immunity would encourage a rash of
vexatious lawsuits of every conceivable nature.
In summing up its decision the court reiterated the role which liability
insurance has played in the abrogation of immunity:
"We are of the opinion that experience has demonstrated no necessity for
continuing the doctrine of immunity as a defense in tort actions brought by
a parent against a child. Our conclusion is influenced by the increasing fre-
quency and severity of automobile accidents and the seriousness of attendant
injuries to members of the same household. The fact that in most instances
the driver is covered by liability insurance minimizes the likelihood of intra-
family discord." Id. at 433, 142 N.W.2d at 75.
135 E.g., Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D. Vt. 1963); Scruggs v.
Meredith, 135 F. Supp. 376 (D. Hawaii 1955); Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497(E.D. Pa. 1954); Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d
419 (1938); London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781(1954); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948); Logan v. Reaves,
209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597,
174 S.E. 841 (1934).
136 Cases cited note 75 supra.
137 Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
138 Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965).
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dubious precedent for the inequitable results reached through im-
munity. One case involved a willful false imprisonment in an insane
asylum,139 one involved cruel and inhuman punishment,140 and the
third denied recovery for a heinous crime. 14 1 Why the rule was ever
adopted in the first instance is not a matter of record and any at-
tempted explanation would be no more than a guess. With the pas-
sage of time more and more exceptions have developed and the effec-
tiveness of the rule has correspondingly decreased.
The present-day frequency of insurance coverage has effectively
eliminated many of the reasons advanced in favor of immunity, and
most courts are willing to at least consider the effect of insurance.
However, courts have become confused over the effect which liability
insurance should have on the perpetuation of the doctrine of im-
munity. For example, courts have denied recovery to the child
both on the basis of the family harmony doctrine and on the basis of
the inconsistent concept of risk of fraud and collusion created by in-
surance. It is submitted that when the administration of justice be-
comes so confused there should be a re-evaluation of the basic prem-
ises for any given rule of law and the re-evaluation and should be
made in the light of existing circumstances. Any fear of increased pos-
sibilities of fraud and collusion can be disspelled by observation of ju-
dicial precedent allowing parent-child suits for damage to property
and the cases allowing suits between brother and sister.1 42 The rea-
sons for the rule have been eliminated and with the reasons should go
the rule.
The great majority of states have adopted one or more of the
exceptions limiting the application of the rule of immunity. The
parent cannot escape liability for maliciously beating his child or for
injuring him while engaged in a business enterprise; and all courts
agree that an emancipated child can recover from his parent in tort.
In a few instances persons standing in loco parentis have been held
liable where a natural parent would be immune, but generally de-
fendants in loco parentis to the child are treated the same as natural
parents. Courts have construed immunity to be a personal privilege
and by so doing have held third parties liable for a parent's negli-
gence. Immunity has also been abolished on the death of the holder
of the privilege. All of these judicial limitations on the rule show
dissatisfaction with its existence.
The many exceptions have culminated in the abrogation of im-
munity in negligence cases in two states.1 43 As between these deci-
sions, that reached by the Wisconsin court seems the most desirable
since it allows the parent the wide discretion needed to effectively
control the child. The parent should not be subjected to the risk of
139 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
140 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
141 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). See generally Parks
v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
142 E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Rozell v.
Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
143 In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has abolished the child's
immunity in suits by the parent and can be expected to abolish the parent's
immunity in suits by the child. Baits v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66
(1966). For a discussion of this holding see note 134 supra.
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suit for activities purely within his discretion. Since most of the
exceptions to the immunity rule are based on liability for acts which
are not referrable to the parental relationship, elimination of im-
munity in negligence cases should also proceed along the same lines.
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